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Abstract
This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT)
operating efficiencies. We estimate stochastic-frontier, panel-data models speci-
fying a translog cost function. The specified model updates the cost frontier with
new information as it becomes available over time. The model can identify fron-
tier cost improvements, returns to scale, and cost inefficiencies over time. The
results disagree with most previous research in that we find no evidence of scale
economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also gener-
ally find smaller inefficiencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary
to previous research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency.
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I. Introduction 
This paper examines frontier cost (technological) improvements, scale economies, and operating 
efficiencies of publicly traded Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). The REIT industry 
experienced explosive growth over the last fifteen years from a total market capitalization of 
$8.74 billion in 1990 to $305.1 billion in 2004 (NAREIT.org). Viewed differently, the 119 
REITs in 1990 averaged $73.4 million assets whereas the 190 REITs in 2004 averaged $1.6 
billion in assets, a dazzling compound growth rate of 22.8 percent per year. As a consequence, 
considerable interest and analysis emerged on the underpinnings and sustainability of this 
sector’s growth. 
 Two schools of thought offer conflicting opinions on the long-term viability of projected 
growth and consolidation in the REIT industry. One view argues that the real estate industry still 
exhibits a cyclical pattern and that the industry cannot long sustain the current growth spurt. For 
example, Vogel (1997) states that external factors drive the rapid growth of the REIT industry, 
not superior operating performance. The alternative perspective argues that the full potential for 
this sector remains significantly untapped and that REITs can continue to expand as low-cost 
producers of investment real estate. Linneman (1997) argues that the sources of the competitive 
advantage include economies of scale, lower capital costs, and superior sources of capital. 
Generally, most commentators think that scale economies and the potential for gains in operating 
efficiencies do exist. Considerable debate continues, however, as to the sources and the 
magnitude of these efficiencies (see Anderson, Lewis, Springer, 2000, for a general review). 
 The literature on REIT operating efficiencies has evolved mostly along the lines of 
improved estimation methods. Our analysis adds to the existing literature along a number of 
dimensions. First and foremost, we provide additional methodological improvements. Whereas 
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previous studies generally use cross-sectional analysis, we use a panel-data model. Specifying a 
translog cost function and using 1995 to 2003 data, we estimate a stochastic-frontier panel-data 
model of REIT operating efficiencies that also identifies various factors that influence efficiency. 
The methodology allows for different production plans or technology to exert control over the 
stochastic frontier estimation as the analysis moves forward from one year to the next. That is, 
the stochastic frontier and its implied technology base get updated over time as more information 
becomes available.1 Also, we use two alternative output measures, total assets and revenues, and 
we incorporate input costs into the model. Most previous studies consider a single output 
measure and do not consider input costs. 2
 Our findings differ from most prior research. When updating the cost frontier as more 
information gets incorporated into the panel data model, we find little evidence of scale 
economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, the consideration of input prices 
and the analysis of the industry using a multi-year sample generally reveal smaller inefficiencies 
than those identified in other studies. The results also show that the efficiency effects of the type 
of REIT management differ according to the output measure used to calculate efficiency. When 
we use revenue to measure output, self-management generally, but not always, associates with 
more efficiency; but when we measure output with assets, external management uniformly 
associates with more efficiency across all sample periods. Also contrary to prior research, higher 
leverage associates with more efficiency. Finally, the results further suggest, in three of our four 
specifications, that REIT inefficiency increases over time. 
                                                 
1 Viewed another way, our method rules out technological regress over time, which can occur n stochastic frontier 
estimations that employ year-by-year cross-section estimation. By retaining all prior years as new data get added to 
the sample, the old technology still exists in the data and will anchor the frontier, if the new year’s cross-section will 
by itself exhibit technical regress. 
2 This study does not perform the first panel-data study on REIT efficiency. Miller, Clauretie and Springer (2006) 
use input costs, panel data, and two output measures. Our study introduces a more refined and improved 
methodology that measures efficiency without holding the cost frontier constant over time. 
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 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature for both 
efficiency studies, in general, and for REITs, in particular. Section III discusses the stochastic-
frontier, panel-data methodology used to estimate REIT operating efficiency. Section IV reports 
and interprets the results of our analysis. Section V concludes. 
II. Literature review 
Cost scale and efficiency studies, using frontier techniques, comprise a substantial literature. The 
application of production and cost frontier analysis to the financial services industry, however, 
remains controversial. The controversy stems from, at least, two sources -- the general debate in 
the empirical production analysis literature and the peculiarities of the financial firm. 
Approaches to Frontier Estimation 
Most reviews of frontier estimation begin with the classic paper by Farrell (1957), which 
introduces the basic framework for studying and measuring inefficiency, defined as deviations of 
actual from "optimum behavior." The frontier establishes the optimum benchmark against which to 
calculate deviations. Various methods, using statistical and mathematical programming techniques, 
exist for the construction-estimation of the relevant frontier. A general distinction emerges between 
deterministic and stochastic frontiers. Deterministic frontiers by construction fix the frontier in the 
relevant space and encompass all sample observations. Thus, a small subset of data supports the 
frontier, making it more prone to sampling, outlier, and statistical noise problems, which may 
distort the measurement of efficiency.3  
 Stochastic frontiers avoid some of the problems associated with deterministic frontiers by 
explicitly considering the stochastic properties of the data, and distinguishing through a composite 
                                                 
3 Van den Broek, Førsund, Hjalmarsson, and Meeusen (1980) provide much discussion and empirical evidence. 
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error term between firm-specific effects, and random shocks or statistical noise. Here, the frontier 
can shift from one observation to the next, being random rather than exact. 
 Other problems still exist, however, with the stochastic-frontier approach. First, 
implementation requires the choice of an explicit functional form for the production or cost 
function, the appropriateness of which raises questions. The use of a flexible functional form, such 
as the translog, helps to alleviate this concern to some extent.  
 Second, the researcher imposes strong distributional assumptions on the error term. While 
debate continues, some evidence suggests a limited effect of distributional assumptions on the 
obtained estimates (e.g., Cowing, Reifschneider, and Stevenson 1983, and Greene 1990). 
Moreover, the relative rankings of firms based on inefficiency calculations seem unaffected. But, 
the absolute levels of inefficiencies differ over different distributional assumptions on the one-
sided error term, with "... the single parameter models ... providing a more pessimistic impression 
than warranted." (Greene 1990, p. 158). 
Frontier Studies of Real Estate Investment Trust Scale and Efficiency 
Examination of REIT economies of scale predates REIT efficiency studies. Bers and Springer 
(1997, 1998a,b) and Ambrose and Pennington-Cross (2000) employ the standard approach of 
estimating the cost function without allowing for the possibility of inefficient production (i.e., 
production above the efficient cost function). They all report evidence of economies of scale for 
REITs.  
 We know of five frontier studies of REIT operating efficiency. Two papers employ data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb (2002) use DEA to calculate 
economies of scale and inefficiency for REITs for a 1992-1996 sample. They find extremely large 
inefficiencies, ranging from 45 to 60 percent. Anderson and Springer (2003) calculate REIT 
 5
efficiency, using DEA for a 1995-1999 sample, and then use that measure as an indicator for 
portfolio selection. Although not the main focus of their paper, they also report extremely large 
levels of inefficiency.  
 Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) estimate a stochastic frontier that incorporates 
Bayesian statistics to calculate economies of scale and inefficiency for REITs over the 1995 to 
1997 period. They report much lower levels of inefficiency than either of the DEA studies.4 Using 
the Bayesian stochastic frontier methodology, they also determine on a case-by-case basis whether 
inefficiency differs between REITs because of (1) management type (i.e., self or externally 
managed), (2) leverage (i.e., high or low leverage), and (3) portfolio diversification (i.e., 
specialized or diversified).5 They find that self-management associates with higher efficiency in 
1995 and 1996, but with lower efficiency in 1997. The 1997 finding raises some concern, since it 
proves inconsistent with prior work (Bers and Springer 1998b and Anderson, Springer, Fok, and 
Webb 2002). Higher leverage REITs exhibit higher inefficiency than lower leverage REITs in all 
three years. Finally, REIT diversification does not affect efficiency, contrary to some of the 
existing evidence (Bers and Springer 1998b and Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb 2002).6  
 The most recent frontier study (Miller, Clauretie, and Springer, 2006) also uses the 
stochastic-frontier methodology using a panel data sample from 1995 to 2003. They propose two 
measures of output and develop two measures of input prices, missing from most prior studies. 
They use the entire panel-data sample to estimate the stochastic frontier and calculate the 
                                                 
4 Since DEA frontiers encompass the entire data set while the stochastic frontier permits individual points to lie 
outside the frontier, finding larger inefficiencies for DEA frontiers relative to stochastic frontiers makes intuitive 
sense. 
5 A dummy variable captures whether the REIT experiences external or self-management. High debt REITs hold a 
debt ratio above 67 percent. Finally, a Hirschman-Herfindhal index above 80 percent identifies a focused- or non-
diversified portfolio. 
6 Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) also use a stochastic-frontier approach. Using data from 1990 to 2001, 
they find scale economies. They consider the stochastic-frontier specification in their penultimate section. The 
description of the model and its estimation prove sketchy, at best. 
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economies of scale and efficiency measures. Their model implicitly assumes that the available 
production plans or technology did not change over the sample period. They find some evidence 
that economies of scale existed in the 1995 to 1997 period, but had disappeared by the 1998 to 
2000 period. Finally, in the 2001 to 2003 period, some evidence of diseconomies of scale 
emerges. Furthermore, they conclude that REITs exhibit much smaller levels of inefficiency than 
previously reported in the literature. 
 While not uniform across studies, many measure output as total assets or by dividing total 
assets into sub-categories. For the DEA studies, inputs reflect total cost or its sub-components – 
interest expense, operating expense, general and administrative expense, and management fees. For 
the stochastic frontier studies, only one includes input prices, which normally occurs in stochastic 
frontier analysis. Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) do not introduce any input prices, but only 
include output in the translog cost function.7 Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) 
apparently use input costs rather than input prices in their stochastic-frontier model. Miller, 
Clauretie, and Springer (2006), the exception, introduce two proxies for input prices – interest 
expense per dollar of debt and other expense per dollar of assets. 
 Our analysis differs from Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) in an important 
methodological respect. They estimate one frontier for the entire 1995 to 2003 sample period, 
implicitly assuming that no technological improvement occurred over time. For example, the 
frontier employs 2003 information to estimate the benchmark frontier for measuring efficiency for 
REITs operating in 1995.8 We only use information available each year to estimate the benchmark 
                                                 
7 That translog cost function appears in Bers and Springer (1998a,b). 
8 Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) do break their sample into three subperiods – 1995 to 1997, 1998 to 2000, 
and 2001 to 2003. But, once again, they estimate the benchmark frontier for measuring inefficiency for all REITs in 
each subperiod using the entire subsample. Thus, for example, the inefficiency of a REAT in 1995 uses the frontier 
estimated with data from 1995 to 1997.  
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frontier for that year. For example, we employ data from 1995 to 2000 to estimate the benchmark 
for calculating inefficiency for REITs operating in 2000. As a result, all findings reported in Miller, 
Clauretie, and Springer (2006) potentially could change when we consider different benchmark 
frontiers for each year covered in our sample (i.e., 1998 to 2003). 
III. Methodology 
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) first introduce the 
stochastic-frontier model, where a stochastic frontier provides an upper bound on actual 
production or a lower bound on actual cost. The basic model assumes a composite error term that 
sums a two-sided error term, measuring all effects outside the firm’s control, and a one-sided, 
non-negative error term, measuring technical inefficiency. A firm can lie on or within the 
frontier, and the distance between actual output and the frontier output represents technical 
inefficiency. The early articles on stochastic frontiers used cross-section data. With panel data, 
however, later models (Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles, 1990; Kumbhakar, 1990; Battese and 
Coelli, 1992) include time-varying inefficiency. 
 As alluded to above, the use of panel data opens an important question concerning what 
data to employ to capture the production plans or technology available for the firms. Tulkens and 
vander Eeckart (1995) offer several possible scenarios. First, the researcher can opt to use the 
cross-section of firms in each year to represent the potential production plans or technology. That 
approach implicitly assumes that past and future production plans or technologies do not play 
any role in determining the frontier for the current time period. We call this approach the no-
memory method, indicating that no information (no memory) other than the current period enters 
into the calculation of the frontier. For REITs, Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) implement 
this method. 
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 At the other extreme, the researcher can use the entire panel data set to define the frontier 
for each and every firm in each and every year. In this case, all existing production plans or 
technologies in the panel data provide the information for specifying the frontier. Such an 
approach probably makes the most sense in an industry where the production plans or technology 
does not change rapidly. We call this approach the perfect forward- and backward-looking 
method, indicating that all information (past, current, and future memory) enters into the 
calculation of the frontier. Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) adopt this method to study 
REIT efficiency 
 Finally, a middle ground exists whereby the current period incorporates the production 
plans or technologies of the current and all past periods.9 That is, the past information on how to 
organize production does not disappear from the memory of the firms in the current period. As 
such, this assumption rules out technical regress, since last period’s production plans or 
technology appears in this period’s information set. We call this approach the perfect backward-
looking method, indicating that all current and past information (past and current memory) enters 
into the calculation of the frontier. 
 We adopt the perfect backward-looking method for our analysis in this paper. Thus, we 
estimate the frontier cost curve in each period, say 1999, using all prior years and the current 
year, that is, 1995 to 1999, in the estimation. Then we calculate the efficiency and economies of 
scale only for the last year in the sample period used, that is, 1999. The calculation of efficiency 
in a prior year, say 1998, comes from estimating the cost frontier using the sample period that 
ends in that year, that is, 1995 to 1998. In sum we calculate the efficiencies and cost elasticities 
                                                 
9 Charnes, Clark, Cooper, and Golney (1985) use a special case of this third option called windows analysis. This 
approach employs a fixed window size so that when the researcher moves to the next time period, the earliest time 
period in the window drops out as the new time period gets added. The third approach discussed in the text employs 
a variable window size that increases by one when the researcher moves to the next time period in the sample. That 
is, once information enters the stock of technical knowledge, it does not disappear or depreciate as time advances. 
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for REITs in 1998, 1999, …, and 2003, estimating the frontiers from data sets of 1995 to 1998, 
1995 to 1999, …, and 1995-2003, respectively. 
The Framework 
In the present study, we view the REIT firm as an intermediary, operating in competitive markets 
and using a multiple input-output technology. The concept of efficiency (and, thus, inefficiency), 
although well rooted in the history of economic thought, possesses a normative character, which is 
reinforced by the short list of inputs normally considered in empirical models.10 Our interpretation 
accords with the widely held view of production as a systematic technical relationship of inputs 
and outputs, and with the observation that firms can survive in markets for extended periods, even 
though they appear to operate at relatively lower levels of efficiency. 
 Our analysis proceeds as follows. We specify and estimate a composite-error model. This 
model separates firm-specific effects, captured by the one-sided error term (uit), from random 
shocks and statistical noise, reflected by the two-sided, symmetric error term (vit), and permits the 
estimation of firm-specific deviations, using the method of Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt 
(1982). We also evaluate the role of some other firm-specific factors that may affect the level of 
inefficiency by specifying the one-sided error term as depending on these additional control 
variables (Battese and Coelli 1995; Coelli 1996).  
The Model 
We estimate a translog variable cost function with a composite error term (εit) that can be written as 
follows (we drop REIT and time subscripts to simplify): 
                                                 
10 Stigler (1976) discusses these issues with some insightful observations. 
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where lnC = the natural logarithm of the cost; lnqi = the natural logarithm of the ith output 
(i=1,...,m); ln(1+pj) = the natural logarithm of one plus the jth input price (j=1,...,n); ε = v + u with 
v ≈ N(0, σ2v) and u ≈ N(m, σ2u), a truncated normal; m = ; xwx
q
s
ss ++ ∑
=1
0 θθ s = alternative control 
variables; w = a two-sided, symmetric random error ≈ N(0, σ2w); and α, ß, π, δ, φ, and θ equal 
coefficients. Since a few observations for pj equal zero, we took the natural logarithm of (1 + pj) so 
as to not lose those observations. 
 The technical efficiency index for each firm in the sample is given as follows (Battese and 
Coelli 1995; and Coelli 1996): 
(2)  . 0
1
q
s s
s
TE exp( u ) exp( x w )θ θ
=
= = + +∑
 We adopt the translog cost function for two basic reasons. First, it imposes virtually no 
restrictions on the first- and second-order effects. At the same time, it also provides a second-order 
logarithmic approximation to an arbitrary continuous transformation surface.11 Second, the dual 
approach, although not free of problems itself, allows the bypassing of the well-known problems of 
multicollinearity that inherently plagues the direct approach. The reliability of our results hinges, of 
course, on the validity of the cost-minimization assumption. 
The Data 
 
11 Previous research on the cost structure of commercial banks concludes in favor of our specification. For example, 
Lawrence (1989) rejects both the more-restrictive Cobb-Douglas specification and the more-flexible Box-Cox 
transformation in favor of the translog. Also, Noulas, Ray, and Miller (1990a), using Call Report data for large banks, 
conclude against homotheticity, constant returns to scale, and so on, while Noulas, Miller, and Ray (1993) demonstrate 
the instability of the findings from alternative Box-Cox transformations. 
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Our data include 1995 to 2003 information on publicly traded REITs listed in the National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) Handbook and the SNL REIT DataSource. 
Due to missing values, the final sample consists of 212, 221, 222, 236, 233, 220, 208, 198, and 132 
REITs in 1995, 1996, …, and 2003, respectively, for a total of 1851 observations.12 Table 1 reports 
summary statistics.  
 Prior research has favored the use of total assets as the measure of REIT output. Lewis, 
Springer, and Anderson (2003) use total assets and market capitalization (i.e., share price times the 
number of shares) as alternative measures of output and conclude that total assets perform the best. 
Following Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006), we use two alternative aggregate measures of 
output (q), total assets and total revenue. That is, the translog cost function includes only one 
output, but we estimate two separate specifications, one for total assets and one for total revenue. 
 Prior research (Bers and Springer 1998a,b; Lewis, Springer, and Anderson 2003) does 
not incorporate input prices.13 While the data source puts a severe constraint on generating input 
prices, Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) construct two proxies for input prices. We adopt 
their approach, calculating the input prices as follows: the average interest cost per dollar of debt 
(average price of debt, i) and the average other expenses per dollar of assets (average price of 
other inputs, r). The dependent variable for the translog panel model is total cost (C), which 
includes (1) interest expense, (2) operating expense, (3) general and administrative expense, and 
(4) management fees. 
 The stochastic cost function includes one output and two input prices. We also introduce 
one control variable to control for different levels of debt. More specifically, we include the debt-
                                                 
12 In addition to missing values, we deleted all observations with a debt-to-asset ratio exceeding one. 
13 Ambrose, Highfield, and Linneman (2005) apparently use input costs, not input prices, in their stochastic-frontier 
model estimation. 
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to-asset ratio, Debt-Ratio, as a continuous variable that effectively shifts the cost frontier. 
Generally, a more leveraged REIT should face higher costs because the debt-service cost is higher. 
Moreover, REITs do not garner any tax shield effect because the interest expense offers no tax 
advantage.  
 The prior discussion focuses on the specification of the frontier cost function. That is, what 
cost frontier associates with a 100-perfcent efficient REIT, given the available technology. The 
estimation technique of the stochastic frontier includes a one-sided error term that captures 
inefficiency deviations above the stochastic cost frontier. We also consider those variables that 
may affect the inefficiency of each REIT. 
 First, we introduce the Debt-Ratio as such a variable. This variable decides whether higher-
debt REITs show different efficiency levels in comparison to lower-debt REITs.14 More leverage 
may associate with more efficiency, however, because management may monitor more closely the 
activities of outsiders, specifically creditors. 
 Next, we include a dummy variable, Self-Managed, that equals one, if the REIT is self-
managed. This variable determines whether self-managed REITs prove more cost efficient than 
externally managed REITs. Self-managed REITs use internal staff to make investment and 
managerial decisions. Externally managed REITs hire outside advisory firms to make these 
decisions. Potential agency problems arise from a misalignment of incentives caused by the 
compensation structure when a REIT uses an outside advisor (Sagalyn 1996). Capozza and 
Seguin (2000) document that most external advisors receive compensation based on a percentage 
of assets and/or property-level cash flows. They demonstrate that externally managed REITs 
underperform internally managed (self-managed) REITs. Because the outside advisor typically 
                                                 
14 Remember that we also allow total cost to adjust due to differences in leverage. 
 13
benefits by having more properties, externally advised REITs generally experience higher 
leverage. Capozza and Seguin (2000) note that when external advisors receive compensation as a 
percentage of assets or cash flow, they possess little incentive to negotiate favorable terms on the 
debt, because interest expenses probably do not affect their compensation. A primary source of 
the underperformance of externally managed REITs relates to the use of debt with above market 
interest rates.15
 Finally, we add a variable to explain changes in efficiency over time. The time variable 
(i.e., Time = 1, 2, …, and 9, corresponding to 1995, 1996, …, and 2003, respectively) measures 
whether REITs became more or less cost efficient over the sample period. For example, the rapid 
growth in the size of the average REIT, mentioned in the introduction, may cause inefficiency to 
rise as managers find it difficult to accommodate rapid growth efficiently. 
IV. Results 
Tables 2 through 7 present the estimated cost frontiers, using panel data sets 1995 to 1998, 1995 to 
1999, …, and 1995 to 2003, respectively, for output defined as total assets and total revenue. We 
report results for specifications without (simple model) and with (complex model) input prices. 
The precise estimating equations emerge from equations (1) and (2) as follows: 
(3)   
1 1 1
0 1 11
1 1 1
1 -
lnCost ln Asset ln Asset ln Asset
Debt Ratio v u ;
α α π
γ
= + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
+ ⋅ + +
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2 2 2 2
0 1 11 1
2 2 2
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2 2 2 2
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ln( i ) ln( i ) ln( r ) ln( r ) ln( r )
ln Asset ln( i ) ln Asset ln( r )
ln( i ) ln( r ) Debt Ratio v u ;
α α π β
δ β δ
φ φ
φ γ
= + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅ + +
                                                 
15 Also, Ambrose and Linneman (2001) note that externally advised REITs have altered their operating 
characteristics, such as debt use, to become more competitive with self-managed REITs. 
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We link the appropriate error specifications in equation (7) to their counterparts in equations (3), 
(4), (5), and (6) and perform a stochastic frontier estimation.  
 Given our approach of the perfect backward-looking method, we report estimated models 
for each year from 1998 to 2003. A comparison of the coefficients over time permits us to 
determine whether cost technology improves. More specifically, adding a year to the sample can 
alter coefficients in two ways. First, if cost technology improves, then the frontier shifts downward, 
lowering cost for a given level of output. In this case, the coefficients that define the cost frontier 
must change from year to year. On the other hand, if cost technology does not improve, the frontier 
does not shift and the coefficients that define the frontier should not change from year to year. 
Second, the coefficients that define how inefficiency responds to its determinants may also adjust. 
In this case, we argue that such shifts imply a fragile, non-robust relationship. 
Shifting Cost Frontiers 
First, we address the question of whether the cost technology improves over the sample period. In 
testing for significant differences in the same coefficients between two consecutive models, we 
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find limited evidence of technological shifts. For example, testing for differences between the 
coefficients that define the cost frontier in Tables 6 and 7 will determine whether the frontier 
shifted between 2002 and 2003. 
 No evidence exists of a cost frontier shift between consecutive years with the exception of 
1998 and 1999. In this case, the results suggest a frontier shift for both the simple and the complex 
specifications when revenue measures output and for the complex specification only when assets 
measure output. For 1998 and 1999, although the coefficient of the debt ratio does not change 
significantly, nearly every other coefficient experiences a significant adjustment. For all other 
years, no evidence emerges to indicate that the frontier shifts because of improved technology. In 
all specifications, the debt ratio associates positively with the total cost. That is, as expected, a 
higher debt ratio raises the REIT’s frontier cost of operation. 
 We searched for regulatory or structural changes as possible explanations for the shift in 
the frontier between 1998 and 1999. But no compelling story emerges. First, the REIT 
Simplification Act of 1997 became effective in 1998. This Act implemented a number of tax-law 
changes, but no one of them should exhibit dramatic effects. Second, analysts refer to the 1992 to 
2001 as the REIT modernization era. In both cases, we see numerous small changes. The 
cumulative effect of these small changes could precipitate a one-time shift in the cost frontier, once 
a threshold is crossed. At the moment, however, our argument proves highly speculative. 
Inefficiency Model 
Next, we consider the inefficiency model. The estimate of gamma provides a test of whether a 
frontier model makes sense in the first place. We note that gamma proves insignificant at the 5-
percent level for the complex specification with output measured by assets in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 7. 
Moreover, even when it is significant, gamma exhibits an extremely small value for this model 
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relative to the other specifications. Finally, the coefficients of the explanatory variables generally 
prove insignificant for this specification. In sum, this specification may imply no inefficiency in 
the REIT industry over the 1998 to 2003 sample period. Thus, we largely ignore further comments 
on the complex specification of the inefficiency model using total assets as the output measure. 
 To interpret the constant and the coefficients in the inefficiency specification, consider the 
simple model with output defined as assets and the estimates reported in Table 7. The constant in 
the estimation of the mean of the one-sided inefficiency term equals –1.6301. Since we estimate 
the mean of the truncated normal distribution function that captures the inefficiency, a negative 
mean implies that the normal distribution locates to the left of the origin. The distribution truncates 
the negative values, leaving only the right-side tail of the distribution. Now, consider the 
coefficient of self-management of 0.5978. For self-managed REITs, the self-management variable 
equals 1 and the new mean of the truncated normal distribution equals –1.0323 (= –1.6301 + 
0.5978). Thus, the distribution shifts to the right and the size of the truncated tail used to calculate 
the inefficiency becomes larger, implying that inefficiency rises. In sum, self-managed REITs 
generate more inefficiency in the specification closest to the Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) 
model. They find that self-management reduces inefficiency in 1995 and 1996, but increases 
inefficiency in 1997. The estimates in Table 7 consider the period from 1995 to 2003 and shows 
that for this specification self-management increases inefficiency, on average.16
 For all specifications with a significant gamma, the debt ratio shows a significant and 
negative effect on inefficiency in all sample periods, save one. That is, a higher debt ratio generally 
associates with higher efficiency. This finding matches the results of Miller, Clauretie, and 
Springer (2006), but counters those of Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) from their Bayesian 
                                                 
16 For the simple specification with output measured by assets, all estimates of the coefficient of the self-managed 
dummy variable produce a significant and positive value. 
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stochastic frontier specification.17 More specifically, we find a significant effect whereby REITs 
using more leverage operate on a higher cost frontier. But, given this finding, higher leverage 
REITs must exercise much more care in their operations, achieving higher efficiency than their 
lower-leveraged colleagues. Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) do not use the debt-to-asset 
ratio to shift their cost frontier. Thus, the effect of the debt-to-asset ratio on the cost function 
dominates its effect on improving efficiency, probably leading to their conclusion that a high debt-
to-asset ratio REIT exhibits more inefficiency (less efficiency). 
 The remaining two explanatory variables – time and self-management – show different 
outcomes over time and across specifications. Self-managed REITs exhibit higher inefficiency in 
the simple model with output measured by assets across all time periods. Self-managed REITs 
generally exhibit lower inefficiency in both models with output measured by revenue, except in 
1999 and 2000 (Tables 3 and 4). The former finding proves consistent with the results of Bers and 
Springer (1998b) and Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb (2002). The latter proves consistent 
with Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003). Because REITs report assets on a cost basis, 
measuring output with assets does not capture managerial efforts to enhance asset value. 
Moreover, revenue correlates more directly with value. Thus, in this instance, measuring output 
with revenue may better reflect the managerial goal of maximizing shareholder value. 
 Finally, for the simple specifications, time reduces inefficiency in 1998 and 1999 (Tables 2 
and 3), but increases inefficiency in 2000 through 2003 (Tables 4 through 7). For the complex 
specification with output measured by revenue, inefficiency consistently increases with time across 
all years. The bulk of the evidence suggests that REITs become more inefficient over time. We 
                                                 
17 We do not consider the portfolio diversification variable. But, Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) find that this 
variable does not generate a consistent effect on REIT inefficiency. Also, a key difference exists between our findings 
and those of Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003). They consider the effects of self-management, the debt ratio, and 
portfolio diversification on a case-by-case basis. We include all control variables simultaneously. Further, our 
specification of the frontier cost function includes the debt-to-asset ratio as a shift variable. 
 18
initially anticipated that REITs would improve their efficiency over time, since improved methods 
of operation should lower cost. It seems unlikely that REITs become less efficient over time 
without some external stimulus. The rapid growth in the size of REITs over the past 15 years may 
explain this increase in inefficiency. Perhaps, management could not keep up with the growth. 
Also, in an expanding REIT industry, the transactions costs of growth may distort the expense 
measurement relative to the expenses of operating a relatively stabilized property portfolio. Also, 
changes in the regulatory environment may have contributed to increased inefficiency.18
Economies and Diseconomies of Scale 
The model estimates permit the calculation of economies of scale. The measure of economies of 
scale equals the cost elasticity with respect to output – either assets or revenue. That is, the cost 
elasticity with respect to output equals the partial derivative of the logarithmic cost functions in 
equations (3), (4), (5), and (6) with respect to the logarithm of output. For example, the cost 
elasticity with respect to output in equation (4) where assets measure output equals the following 
relation: 
(8)  2 2 2 21 11 12 132 1
lnCost ln Assets ln( i ) ln( r )
ln Assets
α π φ φ∂ = + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅ +∂ 1 . 
Using the coefficients from Table 7, we get the exact calculation as follows: 
(9)  1 0166 2 0 0005 0 1027 1 0 0129 1lnCost . . ln Assets . ln( i ) . ln( r )
ln Assets
∂ = + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + + ⋅ +∂ , 
where we need to include values for lnAssets, ln(1+i), and ln(1+r) for each REIT and each time 
period. Table 8 reports the average cost elasticity with respect to output. We calculate the cost 
elasticity for each REIT in the final year of the sample period used to estimate the cost frontier. For 
                                                 
18 In discussing the possible explanations for the significant shift in the frontier between 1998 and 1999, we 
discussed the REIT Simplification Act of 1997, which altered many tax laws. The REIT Modernization Act of 1999, 
became effective in 2001. 
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example, we estimate the average cost elasticity for REITs in 2002 using the frontier estimated 
from the 1995 to 2002 sample period. 
 Except for the specification in equation (4), the cost elasticity does not differ significantly 
from one implying trivial, if any, economies or diseconomies of scale. The specification in 
equation (4) suggests that diseconomies of scale exist, since the cost elasticity significantly exceeds 
one in 2001, 2002, and 2003, but does not significantly differ from one in 1998, 1999, and 2000. 
Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003) report economies (increasing returns) to scale for 1995, 
1996, and 1997, using assets as the measure of output. Bers and Springer (1997, 1998a,b) and 
Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb (2002) also report economies of scale for samples of REITs in 
the 1990s. The limited evidence for diseconomies of scale diminishes when we use revenue as 
output or when we exclude the input price control variables.19 Our findings prove generally 
consistent with those of Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006). 
Inefficiency Estimates 
Table 9 reports the inefficiency estimates from our various specifications and sample periods. As 
before, we calculate the inefficiency for each REIT in the final year of the sample period used to 
estimate the cost frontier. For example, we calculate the inefficiency for REITs in 2000 relative to 
the frontier estimated from the 1995 to 2000 sample period. 
 The lowest inefficiency emerges for the complex specification with output measured by 
assets. But, this specification also shows an extremely small and frequently insignificant gamma 
value, implying that the frontier approach did not apply. In other words, a small and insignificant 
gamma suggests that inefficiency does not exist, corresponding to the small estimates of 
inefficiency. The simple specification with output measured by assets exhibits the most 
                                                 
19 Bers and Springer (1997) do find that the number of REITs exhibiting economies of scale diminishes with the 
inclusion of other control variables 
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inefficiency of about 100 percent on average over the 1998 to 2003 period.20 The specifications 
with output measured by revenue generate average inefficiencies of around 20 and 15 percent for 
the simple and complex specifications, respectively. Our inefficiency estimates generally prove 
consistent with Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) and are generally smaller than those of 
Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003), who report dramatic reductions in inefficiency estimates 
when using the Bayesian stochastic frontier specification rather than DEA. 
V. Conclusions 
The results show that the estimated returns to scale for publicly traded REITs do not support 
economies of scale. That is, our findings suggest no scale economies, but provide some evidence 
for diseconomies of scale. Previous studies generally find economies of scale. Those studies use 
older data and cross-section analysis. Our panel-data model extends the coverage through 2003. 
The rapid growth in the size of REITs may have exhausted the economies of scale for all but the 
smaller firms in the industry. That is, given the dramatic growth in average REIT size over the 
sample period, the movement from no economies of scale early in the sample period to 
diseconomies of scale at the end of the sample period makes intuitive sense.  
 Consistent with the findings of many prior studies, Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) 
identify possible economies of scale during the 1995 to 1997 period. Their methodology applies 
the same frontier to all REITs in the sample period. That is, when they estimate the model using 
the 1995 to 1997 sample period, they calculate the cost elasticity estimate for all REITs in the 
three-year period. This paper uses the panel data set, say 1995 to 1998, to estimate the frontier, 
assuming the perfect backward-looking method. Then we use the estimated frontier to determine 
the cost elasticity only for those REITs in the most recent year, in this case 1998. As such, we find 
                                                 
20 Note that 100-percent inefficiency means that the actual cost doubles the minimum cost of that output. Thus, over 
100-percent inefficiency in cost proves feasible. 
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no evidence of economies of scale, but we begin our examination only in 1998, by which time 
Miller, Clauretie, and Springer (2006) conclude that economies of scale no longer exist in the 
industry. Thus, our current findings do not convey a different story from those of Miller, Clauretie, 
and Springer (2006). 
 The initial tests of REIT efficiency using DEA report large inefficiencies (Anderson, 
Springer, Fok, and Webb, 2002; Anderson and Springer, 2003). Lewis, Springer, and Anderson 
(2003) use a stochastic frontier and find much lower levels of inefficiency than either of the DEA 
studies. This study generally documents even lower inefficiencies. But, we also find that 
inefficiencies increase over time, consistent with the findings of Miller, Clauretie, and Springer 
(2006). 
 The finding that a higher debt-to-asset ratio associates with more efficiency runs counter to 
the findings of Lewis, Springer, and Anderson (2003). Unlike Lewis, Springer, and Anderson 
(2003), we employ the debt-to-asset ratio to shift the frontier cost function as well as to explain the 
one-sided (inefficiency) error term. We find that higher leverage raises the cost frontier and lowers 
inefficiency. Jensen (1986) argues that higher leverage can induce less efficiency through agency 
problems between managers and owners or more efficiency due to more intense external 
monitoring. Our results conform to that latter view.  
 Our results also offer some apparent contradictions to conventional wisdom as well as 
further insight into the REIT industry’s rapid growth. Conventional wisdom and most prior 
research suggest that self-managed REITs exhibit more efficiency than the alternatives, namely 
affiliate- or third-party managed REITs. Our results indicate different outcomes depending on the 
measure of output. When we measure output with assets, self-management associates with more 
inefficiency. Capozza and Seguin (2000) note that external advisers frequently receive 
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compensation tied to assets. This may explain why external advisers prove more efficient when 
assets measure output. When we measure output with revenue, self-management exhibits more 
efficiency, the opposite outcome. We propose that revenue better captures the goal of internal 
managers to maximize shareholder value. Thus, managers expend much effort to wring additional 
revenue out of their firm with much less concern about firm size, as measured by assets. In sum, 
we argue that the contradictory results on the effect of the self-management dummy variable 
supports the use of revenue over assets as a measure of output in REIT economies-of-scale and 
efficiency studies. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Average Median Maximum Minimum
lnCost 11.0783 11.2330 15.9116 2.6391 
lnAssets 13.2183 13.4453 17.0662 7.2779 
lnRevenue 11.3127 11.5140 15.9870 2.0794 
ln(1+i) 0.0653 0.0631 1.0756 0.0000 
ln(1+r) 0.1051 0.0784 1.7815 0.0012 
Time 4.7942 5.0000 9.0000 1.0000 
Self-Managed 0.7758 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Debt-Ratio 0.4941 0.4881 0.9964 0.0031 
 
Note: The symbol ln stands for the natural logarithm. Cost includes interest expense, 
operating expense, general and administrative expense, and management fees 
interest cost on all deposits. Assets equals total assets. Revenue equals total 
revenue. We calculate the input prices as follows: i equals the average interest cost 
per dollar of debt and r equals the average other expenses per dollar of assets. 
Time runs from 1 to 9 capturing 1995 to 2003. Self-Managed equals one for self-
managed REITs; 0 otherwise. Debt-Ratio equals the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. 
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Table 2: Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 1998 
 
Asset Equals Output Revenue Equals Output 
 Simple Model Complex Model  Simple Model Complex Model 
Variable  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Constant_1 -0.4742     -0.55 -6.2649* -7.53 Constant_1 0.3250 1.08 -1.2189* -4.13
lnAsset 0.5560*     4.11 1.2764* 9.74 lnRevenue 0.7654* 13.67 0.9887* 18.62
lnAsset*lnAsset 0.0156*       2.87 -0.0074 -1.44 lnRevenue*lnRevenue 0.0106* 4.01 0.0023 0.92
ln(1+i)     24.2147* 24.41 ln(1+i)     7.6817* 4.49 
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -13.9607* -14.05 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -3.4289* -2.96
ln(1+p)     11.9710* 12.55 ln(1+p)     5.3002* 8.97 
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -6.4275* -9.26 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -2.2816* -9.44
lnAsset*ln(1+i)     -0.6003* -11.96 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)     -0.2781* -3.51
lnAsset*ln(1+p)     -0.0336 -0.85 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)     -0.0869* -3.58
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     -10.7590* -10.88 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     -2.3575* -3.11
Debt-Ratio 2.0906*  18.15 0.8340* 14.26 Debt-Ratio 1.0940*  18.41 0.7195* 17.95
Constant_2 -1.0823    -1.34 -0.0079 -0.39 Constant_2 -0.4187 -0.98 -5.0797* -2.77
Time -0.3919*     -4.55 -0.0116 -1.37 Time -0.2084* -3.44 0.4275** 2.09
Self-Managed 1.2119**   2.21 0.0890* 9.04 Self-Managed -0.5505**  -2.54 -0.5459* -2.70
Debt-Ratio -10.4725* -23.27 -0.0087 -0.79 Debt-Ratio -4.3627*  -4.06 -1.3065* -4.61
Sigma-Squared 2.3247*   7.42 0.0390* 19.73 Sigma-Squared 0.5866*    3.49 0.6388* 3.70
Gamma 0.9321*    85.34 0.0013 1.18 Gamma 0.9186* 39.56 0.9500* 70.68
 
Note: See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev 
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model 
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7). 
 
* significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level.; 
** significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 3: Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 1999 
 
Asset Equals Output Revenue Equals Output 
 Simple Model Complex Model  Simple Model Complex Model 
Variable  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Constant_1 -0.0182      -0.02 -3.2939* -6.31 Constant_1 1.2743* 5.54 -0.1934 -0.83
lnAsset 0.4729*     3.81 0.9371* 14.65 lnRevenue 0.6050* 14.66 0.8471* 19.94
lnAsset*lnAsset 0.0193*       3.97 0.0018 0.55 lnRevenue*lnRevenue 0.0178* 9.28 0.0071* 3.53
ln(1+i)     2.9972* 3.06 ln(1+i)     1.7027 1.55 
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -5.7794* -5.83 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -1.5433** -1.98
ln(1+p)     6.8453* 6.94 ln(1+p)     3.5849* 8.31 
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -3.2301* -52.95 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -1.0245* -7.72
lnAsset*ln(1+i)     0.1578* 2.81 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)     -0.0237 -0.42
lnAsset*ln(1+p)     0.0499 1.35 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)     -0.0614* -3.25
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     -2.0131** -2.04 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     0.3151 0.43 
Debt-Ratio 2.0387* 19.94 0.9461* 15.83 Debt-Ratio 0.9491*  21.24 0.7635* 17.89
Constant_2 -1.8987*     -3.76 -0.0186 -0.63 Constant_2 -3.0645* -2.61 -4.6126* -4.09
Time 0.1389      1.78 -0.0048 -1.56 Time -0.2638* -5.20 0.2518* 4.14
Self-Managed 1.3548*   3.75 0.1100** 2.39 Self-Managed -0.2200   -0.54 0.0379 0.50
Debt-Ratio -10.5132* -10.24 -0.0444 -0.71 Debt-Ratio -3.2843*  -4.58 -1.5865* -6.10
Sigma-Squared 2.2436*   6.42 0.0528* 28.03 Sigma-Squared 0.9053*    4.86 0.5457* 4.70
Gamma 0.9286*    65.34 0.0068* 0.86 Gamma 0.9545* 99.13 0.9390* 72.60
 
Note: See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev 
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model 
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7). 
 
** significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 4: Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 2000 
 
Asset Equals Output Revenue Equals Output 
 Simple Model Complex Model  Simple Model Complex Model 
Variable  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Constant_1 -0.2806     -0.44 -3.6917* -9.16 Constant_1 1.1746* 31.71 0.5864* 3.03
lnAsset 0.5056*     4.91 0.9888* 16.38 lnRevenue 0.6191* 34.18 0.7262* 20.91
lnAsset*lnAsset 0.0183*      4.45 0.0003 0.13 lnRevenue*lnRevenue 0.0171* 16.27 0.0116* 7.08
ln(1+i)     4.8582* 4.99 ln(1+i)     -1.1394 -1.08
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -5.3034* -7.45 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -0.9609 -1.46
ln(1+p)     7.3886* 11.86 ln(1+p)     3.6376* 10.97
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -3.0603* -35.86 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -0.8204* -7.64
lnAsset*ln(1+i)     0.0822** 2.25 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)     0.1047** 2.00 
lnAsset*ln(1+p)     0.0231 1.01 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)     -0.0710* -4.82
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     -2.8554* -4.48 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     -0.0605 -0.11
Debt-Ratio 2.0413*  19.75 0.9527* 60.29 Debt-Ratio 1.0117*  27.44 0.7767* 35.36
Constant_2 -2.1866*    -3.92 -0.0250 -0.48 Constant_2 -1.7772 -1.43 -5.2823* -10.32
Time 0.2903*     6.17 -0.0043 -0.78 Time -0.0581 -0.92 0.1551* 12.59
Self-Managed 1.5030*   8.93 0.1266* 6.68 Self-Managed 0.0632    0.34 0.5522* 7.00
Debt-Ratio -10.2811* -26.81 -0.0603 -0.98 Debt-Ratio -4.6382**  -2.46 -0.9152* -6.94
Sigma-Squared 2.1761*  11.31 0.0466* 18.46 Sigma-Squared 0.7044*   2.71 0.5659* 12.59
Gamma 0.9292*     141.01 0.0063 0.14 Gamma 0.9469* 81.58 0.9432* 202.29
 
Note: See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev 
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model 
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7). 
 
* significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 5: Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 2001 
 
Asset Equals Output Revenue Equals Output 
 Simple Model Complex Model  Simple Model Complex Model 
Variable  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Constant_1 -0.7477      -1.12 -3.6350* -11.60 Constant_1 0.9870* 4.77 0.3580 1.63
lnAsset 0.5717*     5.58 0.9629* 20.76 lnRevenue 0.6582* 17.65 0.7640* 19.94
lnAsset*lnAsset 0.0160*       4.04 0.0018 1.02 lnRevenue*lnRevenue 0.0153* 8.92 0.0104* 6.08
ln(1+i)     7.4872* 7.52 ln(1+i)     0.3319 0.32 
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -4.9699* -16.37 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -0.9809* -3.13
ln(1+p)     7.3628* 17.55 ln(1+p)     3.6432* 10.88
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -2.9385* -39.47 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -0.8179* -8.02
lnAsset*ln(1+i)     -0.0175 -0.44 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)     0.0364 0.73 
lnAsset*ln(1+p)     0.0178 1.13 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)     -0.0725* -4.85
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     -3.9826* -10.26 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     -0.1016 -0.27
Debt-Ratio 2.0549*  23.46 1.0173* 27.75 Debt-Ratio 0.9883*  22.18 0.7245* 19.60
Constant_2 -2.1741*    -4.64 0.0386** 2.02 Constant_2 -2.8946* -4.47 -6.0659* -7.26
Time 0.3572*       8.92 -0.0017 -0.76 Time 0.2209* 6.14 0.3434* 8.97
Self-Managed 1.2663*   4.26 0.1083* 6.34 Self-Managed -0.1681*  -2.76 -0.2732* -5.04
Debt-Ratio -10.4681* -13.43 -0.1438* -4.15 Debt-Ratio -4.5812*  -7.10 -0.2485 -1.32
Sigma-Squared 2.1957*  10.28 0.0469* 30.04 Sigma-Squared 0.7760*    6.30 0.6033* 9.06
Gamma 0.9324*     100.13 0.0025* 3.27 Gamma 0.9546* 129.93 0.9501* 121.82
 
Note: See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev 
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model 
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7). 
 
* significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 6: Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 2002 
 
Asset Equals Output Revenue Equals Output 
 Simple Model Complex Model  Simple Model Complex Model 
Variable  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Constant_1 -1.0151      -1.56 -4.1548* -13.77 Constant_1 0.7803* 4.88 0.4446* 3.62
lnAsset 0.6098*     6.10 1.0256* 22.80 lnRevenue 0.6936* 23.18 0.7491* 31.97
lnAsset*lnAsset 0.0148*       3.81 0.0001 0.08 lnRevenue*lnRevenue 0.0138* 9.84 0.0109* 9.67
ln(1+i)     9.7692* 9.88 ln(1+i)     -0.5412 -0.56
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -5.2861* -16.43 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -0.9795* -3.07
ln(1+p)     7.8270* 18.86 ln(1+p)     4.0188* 12.39
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -2.9764* -39.57 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -0.7419* -7.61
lnAsset*ln(1+i)     -0.0889** -2.26 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)     0.0746 1.57 
lnAsset*ln(1+p)     0.0039 0.25 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)     -0.0911* -6.34
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     -4.6265* -11.75 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     -0.1013 -0.26
Debt-Ratio 2.0383*  25.17 0.9160* 25.92 Debt-Ratio 0.9666*  23.69 0.7543* 19.74
Constant_2 -2.0624*    -7.11 -0.0697** -2.10 Constant_2 -3.2694* -5.40 -2.7253* -9.96
Time 0.3171*   13.94 -0.0041 -1.39 Time 0.2251* 12.11 0.2624* 12.70
Self-Managed 0.8268*   4.14 0.2047* 6.24 Self-Managed -0.8689*  -4.73 -0.6999* -10.17
Debt-Ratio -11.4805* -16.48 -0.0824* -2.76 Debt-Ratio -4.3014*  -12.05 -1.8409* -10.26
Sigma-Squared 2.5368*  10.02 0.0525* 27.93 Sigma-Squared 0.9535*   8.30 0.3801* 13.89
Gamma 0.9370*     111.35 0.0086* 2.63 Gamma 0.9648* 198.84 0.9204* 108.83
 
Note: See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev 
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model 
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7). 
 
* significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 7: Frontier Estimates of Translog Cost Function using Data from 1995 to 2003 
 
Asset Equals Output Revenue Equals Output 
 Simple Model Complex Model  Simple Model Complex Model 
Variable  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Constant_1 -1.1090      -1.54 -4.0884* -15.52 Constant_1 0.7428* 5.39 0.5517* 3.30
lnAsset 0.6217*     5.63 1.0166* 26.88 lnRevenue 0.6981* 28.89 0.7324* 24.95
lnAsset*lnAsset 0.0143*      3.33 0.0005 0.39 lnRevenue*lnRevenue 0.0136* 12.31 0.0117* 8.81
ln(1+i)     10.1945* 10.37 ln(1+i)     -0.7977 -0.82
ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -5.3714* -17.22 ln(1+i)*ln(1+i)     -0.8953* -2.83
ln(1+p)     7.5172* 19.29 ln(1+p)     3.9660* 12.53
ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -2.9532* -42.84 ln(1+p)*ln(1+p)     -0.7443* -8.09
lnAsset*ln(1+i)     -0.1027* -2.62 lnRevenue*ln(1+i)     0.0805 1.75 
lnAsset*ln(1+p)     0.0129 0.88 lnRevenue*ln(1+p)     -0.0916* -6.61
ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     -4.6010* -13.30 ln(1+i)*ln(1+p)     0.0327 0.09 
Debt-Ratio 2.0825*  29.41 0.9097* 32.54 Debt-Ratio 0.9819*  30.13 0.7344* 23.90
Constant_2 -1.6301*    -5.27 0.0148 0.56 Constant_2 -2.3940* -4.49 -2.8996* -8.17
Time 0.2886*     13.47 -0.0055* -5.70 Time 0.1490* 5.07 0.2006* 10.92
Self-Managed 0.5978*   3.59 0.1068* 2.68 Self-Managed -0.7536*  -10.19 -0.8617* -10.83
Debt-Ratio -11.5772* -34.08 -0.0716* -4.41 Debt-Ratio -4.9426*  -20.58 -1.8687* -8.87
Sigma-Squared 2.4366* 16.49 0.0509* 30.10 Sigma-Squared 0.8796*   8.02 0.4430* 10.63
Gamma 0.9368*    173.46 0.0019 1.80 Gamma 0.9621* 197.33 0.9332* 130.70
 
Note: See Table 1. We specify the cost frontier as a translog function where the debt-to-asset ratio shifts the intercept. Asset equals total assets and Rev 
equals total revenue. Sigma-squared (σ2) equals σv2 + σu2 and gamma equals σu2/σ2. The simple model excludes input prices, the complex model 
includes them. The Constant_2 and the variables that follow it refer to the estimates of the inefficiency term; see equation (7). 
 
* significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 8: Average Economies of Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assets Revenue   
Year Simple Complex Simple Complex 
1998 (236) 0.9723 1.0426 1.0060 1.0173 
1999 (233) 0.9892 1.0013 1.0142 1.0020 
2000 (220) 0.9991 1.0054 1.0176 0.9957 
2001 (208) 1.0039 1.0124** 1.0159 1.0018 
2002 (198) 1.0119 1.0234* 1.0161 0.9976 
2003 (132) 1.0288 1.0266* 1.0362 1.0166 
      
Total (1,227) 0.9982 1.0181 1.0162 1.0046 
Note: The numbers report the average economies of scale measure for REITs in 
each year based on Assets and Revenue as output and using the simple (no 
input prices included in the translog specification) and complex (including 
input prices models in the translog specification). Total measures the average 
across all six years. Numbers in parentheses equal the number of REITs. 
 
* means significantly different from one at the 1-percent level in a two-
tailed test. 
** means significantly different from one at the 5-percent level in a two-
tailed test. 
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Table 9: Average Efficiency 
 
Assets Revenue   
Year Simple Complex Simple Complex 
1998 (236) 1.6836 1.0240 1.1669 1.1512 
1999 (233) 2.1885 1.0367 1.1680 1.1353 
2000 (220) 2.1751 1.0366 1.1802 1.1318 
2001 (208) 2.0271 1.0485 1.2644 1.1713 
2002 (198) 1.8363 1.0478 1.2938 1.1805 
2003 (132) 2.2358 1.0317 1.2005 1.1331 
      
Total (1,227) 2.0099 1.0375 1.2102 1.1509 
 
Note: The numbers report the average efficiency measure for REITs in each year 
based on Assets and Revenue as output and using the simple (no input 
prices included in the translog specification) and complex (including input 
prices models in the translog specification). Total measures the average 
across all six years. Numbers in parentheses equal the number of REITs. 
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